The state is defined as an agency with two unique characteristics.
First, it is a compulsory territorial monopolist of ultimate decision-making (or jurisdiction).
That is, it is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict, including conflicts involving itself.
Second, the state is a territorial monopolist of taxation.
That is, it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price citizens must pay for its provision of law and order.
Now predictably, if one can only appeal to the state for justice, justice will be perverted in favor of the state.
Instead of resolving conflict, the state will provoke conflict in order to settle it to his own advantage.
Worse, while the quality of justice will fall under monopolistic auspices, its price will rise.
Instead of concentrating on the internal consequences of the institution of a state, however,
I will focus on its external consequences, on foreign policy.
For one, as an agency that perverts justice and imposes taxes, every state is threatened with "exit."
Especially its most productive citizen may leave the territory of the state.
No state likes this of course.
Instead of seeing the range of control and tax base shrink, state agents prefer that they be expanded.
Yet that brings the state into conflict with other states.
And unlike the competition between "natural" persons and institutions,
the competition between states is eliminative competition.
That is, there can be only one monopolist of ultimate decision-making and taxation in any given area.
Consequently, the competition between states promotes a tendency toward political centralization and ultimately
a single world state.
Furthermore, as tax-funded monopolists of ultimate decision-making, states are aggressive institutions.
Whereas "natural" persons and institutions
must bear the cost of aggression themselves states can externalize this cost onto their taxpayers.
Hence, state agents are prone to become provocateurs and aggressors and the process of centralization
can be expected to proceed by means interstate war.
Moreover, given that states must begin small
and assuming as the starting point a multitude of independent territorial units,
something specific about the requirement of success can be stated.
Victory or defeat in interstate warfare depend of course on many factors,
but in the long run the decisive factor is the relative amount of economic resources at a state's disposal.
In taxing and regulating, states do not contribute to the creation of economic wealth.
However, state governments can influence the amount of existing wealth negatively.
That is to say, the lower the tax and regulation burden imposed on the domestic economy,
the larger the larger will be the amount of wealth on which the state can draw in its conflicts.
That is, states which tax and regulate their economies comparatively little — liberal states in the european sense —
tend to defeat and expand their territories or their range of hegemonic control at the expense of less-liberal ones.
This explains, why Western Europe came to dominate the rest of the world instead than the other way around.
More specifically, it explains why it was first the Dutch,
then the British and finally, in the 20th century, the United States, that became the dominant imperial power,
and why the United States, internally one of the most liberal states (again in the good sense),
has conducted the most aggressive foreign policy,
while the former Soviet Union, for instance, with its entirely illiberal (repressive) domestic policies
has engaged in a comparatively peaceful and cautious foreign policy.
Because the United States knew that it could militarily beat any other state;
and in contrast, the Soviet Union knew that it was bound to lose a military confrontation with any state
of substantial size unless it could win within a few days or weeks.
Historically, most states have been monarchies, headed by absolute or constitutional kings.
and democratic states (including so-called parliamentary monarchies such as Britain for instance),
headed by presidents were rare until the French Revolution
and this democracies have assumed world-historic importance only after World War I.
Now while all states must be expected to be aggressive,
the incentive structure faced by traditional kings on the one hand and modern presidents on the other,
is different enough to account for different kinds of war.
Whereas kings viewed themselves as the private owner
of the territory under their control, presidents consider themselves as temporary caretakers.
The owner of a resource of a country
is concerned about the current income to be derived from the resource and the capital value embodied in it
His interests are becauses of it long-run,
with a concern for the preservation and enhancement of the capital values embodied in "his" country.
In contrast, the caretaker of a resource
is concerned primarily about his current income and pays little or no attention to capital values.
The empirical upshot of this different incentive structure is that monarchical wars
tended to be "moderate" and "conservative" as compared to democratic warfare.
Monarchical wars typically arose out of inheritance disputes
They were characterized by tangible territorial objectives.
And not by ideological motives.
The public considered war the king's private affair, to be executed with his own money and military forces.
Moreover, as conflicts between different ruling families,
kings felt compelled to recognize a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants
and target their war efforts exclusively against each other and their family estates.
In contrast to the limited warfare of the Ancien Régime
the era of democratic warfare — which began with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars,
continued during the 19th century with the American War of Southern Independence,
and reached its apex during the 20th century with World War I and World War II — has been the era of total war.
In blurring the distinction between the rulers and the ruled under democracy
("we all rule ourselves" as you know),
democracy strengthened the identification of the public with a particular state.
Rather than dynastic property disputes which could be resolved through conquest and occupation,
democratic wars became ideological battles:
which could only be resolved through cultural, linguistic, or religious domination and, if necessary, extermination.
It became increasingly difficult for members of the public to extricate themselves from personal involvement in a war.
Resistance against higher taxes to fund a war was considered treasonous.
Because the democratic state, unlike a monarchy, was "owned" by all,
conscription became the rule rather than the exception.
And with mass armies of cheap and hence easily disposable conscripts fighting for national goals,
backed by the economic resources of the entire nation,
all distinctions between combatants and noncombatants disappeared.
Collateral damage was no longer an unintended side-effect but became an integral part of warfare.
Now so far I have explained how this institution of the state leads to war;
why, seemingly paradoxical, internally liberal states tend to be imperialist powers;
and how the spirit of democracy has contributed to the de-civilization in the conduct of war.
More specifically, I have explained the rise of the United States to the rank of the world's foremost imperial power;
and, as a consequence of its transformation from the beginnings as an aristocratic republic
into a mass democracy, the role of the United States as an increasingly arrogant warmonger.
What appears to be standing in the way of peace and civilization, then, is above all the state and democracy,
and specifically the world's model democracy: the United States.
Ironically if not surprisingly, it is precisely the United States, which claims
that it is the solution to the quest for peace.
The reason for this claim is the doctrine of democratic peace,
which goes back to the days of Woodrow Wilson and World War I,
and has been revived in recent years by George W
and his neo-conservative advisors.
This theory of democratic peace claims as following:
1. Democracies do not go to war against each other.
2. Hence, in order to create lasting peace, the entire world must be made democratic.
And as a — largely unstated — corollary:
3. Today, many states are not democratic and resist internal — democratic — reform.
4. Hence, war must be waged on those states in order to convert them to democracy and thus Democracies do not go to war against each other
and thus create lasting peace,
I do not have the patience for a full-blown critique of this theory.
But I shall provide a brief critique at least of the theory's premise and of its final conclusion.
First: Do democracies not go to war against each other?
Since almost no democracies existed before the 20th century
the answer must obviously be found within the last hundred years or so.
In fact, the bulk of the evidence offered in favor of the thesis is the observation that the countries of Western Europe
have not gone to war against each other in the post–World War II era.
Likewise, in the Pacific region, Japan and South Korea have not warred against each other.
Does this evidence prove the case?
The democratic-peace theorists think so.
and as they see it there are plenty of "cases" on which to build such proof:
Germany did not war against France, Italy, England, etc.;
France did not war against Spain, Italy, Belgium, etc..
Moreover, there are permutations: Germany did not attack France, nor did France attack Germany, etc..
Thus, we have seemingly dozens of confirmations — and not a single counterexample for some 60 years —
But do we really have that?
The answer is of course no:
we have actually no more than a single case at hand.
With the end of World War II, all of Western Europe
(and Japan and South Korea in the Pacific region)
become part of the US Empire, as indicated by the presence of US troops in practically all of these countries.
What the post World War II period of peace then "proves" is not that democracies
do not go to war against each other but that this imperialist power such as the United States
did not let its various colonial parts go to war against each other
also be not seen, by the way, any wars breaking out between all those countries that were dominated by Soviet Union
as long as Soviet Empire existed,
from which we also do not arose the conclusion that communist dictatorships
and the russian controlled do not go to war against each other, so because of that we to introduce something like this.
So then second point is: What about democracy as a solution to anything.
First, the theory involves a conceptual conflation of democracy and liberty (freedom)
that can only be called scandalous,
The foundation of liberty is private property;
and private — exclusive — property is incompatible with democracy — majority rule.
Democracy is a soft variant of communism,
and rarely in the history of ideas has it been taken for anything else.
except of course Mr. Bush.
Second, the theory of democratic peace distinguishes only between democracy and non-democracy,
which is all summarily labeled as dictatorships.
Everything that is not a Democracy is a dictatorship for them.
Thus not only disappear all aristocratic-republican regimes from view,
but also all traditional monarchies.
They are equated with dictatorships a la Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Mao.
In fact, however, traditional monarchies have little in common with dictatorships.
Monarchies are the semi-organic outgrowth of hierarchically structured natural — stateless — societies.
Kings are the heads of extended families, tribes, and nations.
They command a great deal of natural, voluntarily acknowledged authority,
which was accumulated over many generations.
It is within the framework of such orders that liberalism (in the european sense) first developed and flourished.
And in contrast, democracies are egalitarian in outlook;
Characteristically, the transition from the monarchical age to the democratic age,
in the second half of the 19th century,
has seen the steady decline of liberal parties and a corresponding strengthening of socialists of all stripes.
Democracy and socialism go hand in hand.
Third, it follows from this that the view democratic-peace theorists have of,
conflagrations such as World War I must be considered to be grotesque.
For them, World War I was essentially a war of democracy against dictatorship;
and hence, it was a progressive, peace-enhancing, and ultimately a justified war.
In fact, matters are very different.
To be sure, pre-World War I Germany and Austria may not have been as democratic as England, or the United States
But Germany and Austria were not dictatorships, but increasingly emasculated monarchies.
and as such arguably as liberal — if not more so — than their counterparts. (The United States and England.)
For instance, in the United States, anti-war proponents were jailed,
the German language was essentially outlawed, and citizens of German descent were openly harassed
Nothing comparable occurred in Austria and Germany at that time.
In any case, however, the result of the crusade to make the world safe for democracy was less liberal
than what had existed before (and the Versailles peace dictate precipitated as you know the World War II).
Not only did state power grow faster after World War I
(After the democratization taken place)
than before. In particular, the treatment of minorities deteriorated in the democratized post–World War I period.
In newly founded Czechoslovakia, for instance,
the Germans were systematically mistreated (until they were finally expelled by the millions
and butchered by the tens of thousands after World War II) by the majority Czechs.
Nothing remotely comparable had happened to the Czechs during the previous Habsburg reign.
And the situation regarding the relations between Germans and southern Slavs in pre-war Austria versus post-war Yugoslavia
was quite similar.
Democracy then is something that Mises recognizes in his 1909 book, "Nation, Economy and State."
Democracy does not work in multi-ethnic societies
It does not create peace but promotes conflict and has potentially genocidal tendencies.
Fourth point: The democratic-peace theorists claim that democracy is a stable "equilibrium."
This has been expressed most clearly by Francis Fukuyama,
who labeled the new democratic world order as the "end of history."
However, overwhelming evidence exists that this claim is patently wrong.
On purely theoretical grounds:
How can democracy be a equilibrium
if it is possible that it be transformed democratically into a dictatorship,
i.e., a system which is considered not stable?
The answer is of course: that makes no sense whatsoever!
In addition, empirically democracies are anything but stable.
As indicated before, in multi-cultural societies democracy regularly leads to oppression, or even expulsion
and extermination of minorities
— that seems to be hardly a peaceful equilibrium.
And in homogeneous societies, democracy regularly leads to class warfare,
which leads which leads to dictatorship.
Think, for example, of post-Czarist Russia, post-World War I Italy,
Weimar Germany, Spain, Portugal, and in more recent times Greece, Turkey, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, and Pakistan.
Not only is this correlation between democracy and dictatorship troublesome for democratic-peace theorists;
worse, they must face the fact that the dictatorships emerging from crises of democracy
are not always worse, from a libertarian point of view, than what would have resulted otherwise.
Cases can be cited where dictatorships were preferable
Think of Italy and Mussolini definitely preferable for having a democratic and established communist Italy.
Or Spain and Franco.
In addition, how is one to square the starry-eyed advocacy of democracy with the fact that dictators,
quite unlike kings who owe their rank to an accident of birth,
are often favorites of the masses and in this sense highly democratic?
Just think of Lenin or Stalin, who were certainly more democratic than Czar Nicholas II;
or think of Hitler, who was definitely more democratic and a "man of the people" than Kaiser Wilhelm II or Kaiser Franz Joseph.
According to democratic-peace theorists, then, it would seem that we are supposed to war against foreign dictators,
whether kings or demagogues,
in order to install democracies, which then turn into (modern) dictatorships,
until finally, one supposes, the United States itself has turned into a dictatorship,
owing to the growth of internal state power which results from the endless "emergencies" engendered by foreign wars.
Better, I dare say,
to heed the advice of Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn and, instead of aiming to make the world safe for democracy,
we try making it safe from democracy — everywhere, but most importantly in the United States.
Now if it is stored into the theory of democratic peace
I'm back to the proposition that there is no greater threat to lasting peace
in the democratic State and in particular the United States
and the questions of this is how to defend oneself against the United States.
Now incidentally this is not only a question for foreigners, but a question for Americans as well.
after all the territory constituting the United States too is occupied territory.
Conquered by the United States government.
Now let us assume then that the small territory within the borders of the current United States
a village or town or county declares its independence and secede from the United States.
What can involve United States do in response to this?
The certain possible that the United States would invade the territory and crush the secessionist.
This is what the French Republic did to the Vendée during the French Revolution
This is what the Union did to the confederacy,
and on a much smaller scale this is what the United States government did in Waco.
but history also provided examples to the contrary.
The Czech and the Slovak separated peacefully
Russia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia go.
The slovenes were let go by Yugoslavia at that time
Singapore was off even expelled from previous Union with Malaysia.
Now obviously the relative population size matters in the decision to war or not to war.
Likewise it matters what resources are at the receptionist's disposal.
Also the geographical location can weigh in favor or against intervention.
but this cannot be all.
For how is one to explain for instance that France has not long ago conquered Monaco?
or Germany Luxembourg or Switzerland Liechtenstein or Italy the Vatican City or the United States Costa Rica?
or how is one to explain that the United States does not finish the job in Iraq by simply killing all the iraqis?
Surely in terms of population technology in geography such a manageable tasks.
Now the reason is not that french, german, swiss, italian or United States state rulers have scruples
against conquest confiscation and the imprisonment or killing of Innocents
They do these things all the time on a daily basis to their own population.
Bush for instance has no compunction ordering to killing innocent iraqis,
he does so everyday.
Rather what constraints the conduct of State rulers is public opinion.
As la Boétie, Hume, Mises and rothbard have explained
government power ultimately rests on opinion and not on brute force.
Bush does not kill himself
or put the gun to the head of those, he orders to kill.
Generals and soldiers follow his orders on their own.
Nor can Bush force anyone to continue providing him with the funds needed for his aggression.
The citizenry must do so on its own
On the other hand it's a majority of general soldiers and citizens stop believing in the legitimacy of bush's command
his commands turn into nothing more than hot air.
It is this need for legitimacy that explains why state governments itching to go to war must offer a raise.
The public is not typically in favor of killing innocent bystanders for fun and profit.
Rather, in order to enlist the public's assistance, evidence must be manipulated
so as to make aggression appear as defense.
For what reasonable person could be against defense?
No y sabemos por supuesto las palabras clave en todo esto esto.
Fort Sumter, the USS Maine, the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, and 9/11.
It just turns out that not even an overwhelming size advantage is decisive in determining the course of act .
The David Koresh and his followers in Waco could be brutally killed by the United States government
was due to the fact that they quickly portrayed as a bunch of crazy child molesters.
Let there be normal people and Invasion might have been considered a public relations disaster.
Moreover regardless of whatever disadvantage that there's a session this have in terms of size
resources or location this can all be made up by a favorable International public opinion
especially in the Internet age when the spread of news is almost instantaneous.
Now these considerations are bring me to my final points.
The new secessionist country can be either another state
or it can be a free stateless society.
And I want to argue that the likelihood of a successful defense against the United States
is higher if the secessionist form a stateless society
than if they up for another smaller state,
who with a large or small, states are always good at aggression but all this bad at defense.
As a side remark planting may be prematurely that the United States had nothing to do with 9/11 directly
what events of that day certainly show that the United States was not good at defending its own Citizens
first by provoking the attacks and secondly in having its population disarm and defenseless
Vis a vis box cutting wielding foreign Invaders.
Now know would the defense of a free society differ from that of the state?
As I explained the likelihood of an attack depends essentially on the ease of manipulating the evidence
so as to camouflage aggression as defense.
And to discover such evidence is much easier in the case of a state.
Even the most liberal state has a monopoly of jurisdiction and taxation
and this can not but create victims
who can be properly stylized as victims of human rights violations
and thereby then provide an excuse for an invasion.
Whereas if the new state is a democracy it is unavoidable that one group,
the catholics or the protestants, the shias or the sunnis
the whites or the blacks will use its power to dominate and measure and again
there exists then an excuse for invasion.
-'Let me to free this oppressed minority'.-
But still the oppressed are incited to cry out for help
Moreover in reaction to domestic oppression terrorists may grow-up who try to revenge the injustice.
Just think of the Red Brigades, the RAF, the IRA, the ETA in Vasc country,
and both, the continued existence as well as the attempt of
eradicating these terrorist organizations may provide reason to intervene
namely on the one hand, to prevent the spread of terrorism
or on the other hand to come to the rescue of freedom fighters
In contrast in a free society only private property owners and forms including Insurance police and arbitration agencies exist,
and if there are any aggressions they are sought of criminals of murderous, rapist, burglars, and planned frauds,
and it is very difficult to portray the treatment of criminals as criminals as a reason for an invasion.
Now what if an attack does occur after all.
In that case it might well be best to give up quickly
especially if the secessionist territory is very small.
Thus Mogens Glistrup the founder of the Danish Progress Party
he wants recommended that the Defense Department of tiny Denmark be replaced
with an answering machine announcing (at that time to the Russians), that
"-We surrender!".
This way no destruction will occur
and get the reputation of the invading government
as a defender and promoter of liberty would be soiled forever.
Now this leads them to a central question regarding the effectiveness of states versus free societies in methods of defense.
Now as a monopolist of ultimate decision making
the state decides for everyone bindingly, whether to resist or not to resist.
If to resist whether in the form of civil disobedience, armed resistance or some combination of these things
And if armed to resistance, of what form ?
If the state decides to put up no resistance
this may be a well-meaning decision or it may be the result of bribes or threats
by the invading state but in any case
it will be contrary to the will of many who would have liked to resist and who has put in double jeopardy
because as resistors they know disobey their own state as well as the invader.
And on the other hand if the state decides to resist
this again maybe a well-meaning decision or it may be a well-meaning decision or it may be the result of Pride or fear
but again in any case it too will be contrary to the preferences of many
who would have liked not to resist or to resist by different means
and who are now entangled as accomplices in the state schemes
and subjected to the same collaterally fall out and victory of justice as everyone else.
Now the reaction of a free territory would be distinctly different.
There's no government which makes one decision.
Instead they are numerous institutions and individuals who choose their own defense strategy.
Each in accordance with one's own risk assessment.
Consequently the aggressor has far more difficulties conquering the territory.
It is no longer sufficient to know the government.
to win one decisive battle or to gain control of government headquarters.
Even if one opponent is known, one battle is won
and one defense agency is defeated,
this has no bearing whatsoever on others.
Moreover the multitude of command structures and strategies as well
as a contractual character of free societies affect the conduct of both armed and unarmed resistance.
As for armed resistance in state territories the civilian population is typically unarmed
and heavy reliance exists on regular text and draft funded armies and conventional warfare.
hence the defense force create enemies even among its own citizenry
which the aggressor then can use it on its own advantage
and in any case there is little to fear for the aggressive once the regular army is defeated.
In contrast the population of free territories is likely heavily armed
and the fighting is done by irregular militias
lead by defence professionals it in the form of guerilla or partisan warfare.
All fighters are volunteers and all of their support food, shelter, logistical help and so on, is also voluntary.
Hence guerillas must be extremely friendly to their own population
but precisely this:
their entirely defensive character
and their near unanimous support and public opinion can render nearly invincible,
even by numerically far superior invading armies.
History provides numerous examples for this,
Napoleon's defeat in Spain against guerillas fighting
France defeat in Algeria for instance, the United States defeat in Vietnam and Israel's defeat in South Lebanon.
This consideration leaves immediately to the other form of Defense than the civil disobedience
provided only that the secessionist have the will to be free.
The effectiveness of a strategy of civil disobedience can hardly be overestimated
recall that power does not rest alone on brute force but must rely on opinion.
The conquerors cannot put one man next to each secessionist and force him to obey their orders.
The secessionist must obey by their own free will.
However if they do not the Concourse will fail.
Most importantly civil disobedience can occur in many forms and degrees.
It can range from ostentatious acts of defiance to entirely unobtrusive ways.
Just allow almost everyone to participate in the defense effort.
The courageous, and the teammate, the young and the old, leaders and followers,
one may hide armed fighters or not hinder them,
one may publicly refused to obey certain laws or evade and ignore of them.
One may engage in sabotage, obstruction, negligence or simply display a lack of diligence,
one may openly scoff at orders or comply only incompletely.
Tax payments may be refused or evaded.
There may be demonstrations, seatings, boycotts, work stoppages or plane slacking off.
The conquerors maybe maltreated, molested, ridiculed, laughed or simply ostracize that never existed in anything.
In any case all of this contributes to the very same result mainly to render the conqueror powerless.
To make them disappear and finally resign and withdraw.
Now this often the case, the first step in the anti-imperialist, anti-democratic struggle,
is always the most difficult one.
Indeed the difficulties are in enormous.
I do not want to this minimize this.
But once the first step has been successfully taken however, things get successively easier.
Once the number of secessionist territories has reached a critical mass
and every success in one location will promote imitation in other localities
then the difficulties of crushing the secessionist will increase exponentially.
In fact, the more time passes, the greater will be the comparative economic and technological advantage of free territories
and in light of the ever-increasing attractiveness and economic opportunities offered by free territories
the imperialist powers will be increasingly happy
if they can hang onto their power rather than risk whatever legitimacy they're still have in an attack.
So there is some hope at least.
Thank you very much!
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