HENRIK: Adolf Hitler…
Who was he?
What [were] his goals?
Did he want to conquer the world?
Did he want to create a 'New World Order'?
Well, these are just a few of the questions that we'll attempt to answer with our guest
today; Dennis Wise from the UK, who's behind the very well made, excellent and moving documentary
called "Adolf Hitler: The Greatest Story Never Told" […] First of all just great
job on the documentary Dennis, it's very well made, I want to first of all just, well
thank you for making it, and for giving people an opportunity to actually get an ounce of
objectivity and some kind of honest material on what indeed is the greatest story never
told, so thank you for making it Dennis.
DENNIS: Well, let me thank you, because not everybody looks at it that way – ahhh, but…
PROBLEM GENE: This documentary, Adolf Hitler: The Greatest Story Never Told made by Dennis
Wise, is six hours long, which means that I will focus only on the most central points
of the documentary, so that this won't take forever.
It should be a good idea to stay even if you've never heard of this documentary, since what
you're about to hear are very standard apologetics for Hitler, and knowing how to debunk them
might come in handy when you're dealing with people who sympathize with Hitler's
anti-Semitic ambitions.
Let's begin, and see if Dennis Wise will live up to his name.
Now allow me to talk for a moment about this German economic miracle, and no, it's not
pure fantasy, but it's not impressive in the way that Dennis, our Hitler apologist
here, is suggesting.
The economic recovery was not of Hitler's making; Hitler lacked even a basic understanding
of economics, and the work-creation programs were developed and implemented by other people.
The economic recovery began under the previous Chancellors, and under their leadership the
plans for road-building, agricultural improvement and housebuilding were made, but these plans
only came into effect in late January 1933 – just in time for Hitler's party, the
NSDAP, to take full credit.
Given these facts, and the fact that with the help of a guy named Hjalmar Schacht, Germany
had already managed to overcome one major economic crisis in the early 1920s, it's
not unreasonable to believe that Germany could have recovered from the 1930s crisis too even
if the NSDAP had not gotten into power.
The road-building – while it did happen – produced about 20% of the jobs the NSDAP
had predicted.
The most important factor in the German economy was the rearmament – that is turning Germany
into a military power, which had begun in February 1933 and was quickly bringing results
in the unemployment statistics.
Before the rearmament took utmost priority, the NSDAP also enacted extensive subsidizing
programs, which the new regime wouldn't have been able to pay for without Hjalmar
Schacht, the same genius who had rescued the German economy before, who now developed
a scheme involving the so-called "Mefo bills".
These "Mefo" bills brought Germany close to inflation, but they were also used to pay for about 50%
of the arms purchases of the military in 1934-36.
From 1936 onwards the rearmament became the central focus of the German economy – against
all advice from Schacht, since Hitler believed that preparing for a war was the absolute
priority.
This meant much greater state intrusion into the economy, but none of this would have brought
long term economic prosperity for Germany; by 1939 Germany was suffering from raw material
shortages, which had a visible effect on the lives of its citizens, foreign debt was rising
and foreign exchange reserves were falling, but the NSDAP leaders had an ideology that
demanded the acquisition of Eastern European territory, and they were banking on that acquisition
to solve the economic problems.
That didn't go quite as planned...
Then the documentary tells about the German annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia
– the narrative here is very similar to the one in German propaganda at the time.
What Dennis leaves out is how cooperative Britain and France were, especially in regards
to Czechoslovakia, but they had also looked the other way when Germany occupied Rhineland
and Austria.
In late 1938, by signing the Munich agreement, the Brits and the French gave Hitler permission
to occupy sections of Czechoslovakia, which he did, but because of the pressing economic
difficulties in Germany, the strategic value the rest of Czechoslovakia had, and the fact
that Hitler was disappointed by the Munich agreement since he had long wanted the whole
of Czechoslovakia, in March 1939 Hitler decided to occupy the rest of Czechoslovakia as well.
Only after this violation and complete dishonoring of the Munich agreement did the Brits and
the French give up their policy of trying to appease Germany, as they realized that
Hitler could not be trusted and he was not interested in simply righting the wrongs of
the Versailles Treaty.
Next, we are dealing with anti-Semitic conspiracy theories; apparently Germany losing the
First World War was the fault of Jews, since they were allegedly
responsible for bringing the US into the war.
BENJAMIN FREEDMAN: After we got into the war, the Zionists went to Great Britain, and they
said "let's have something in writing that shows that you are going to keep your
bargain, and give us Palestine after you win the war", and that was called the Balfour Declaration.
The Balfour Declaration was merely Great Britain's promise to pay the Zionists what they had
agreed upon as a consideration for getting the United States into the war.
[the word "claim" used too many times in this segment…]
PROBLEM GENE: An interesting claim, definitely, but the declaration simply talks about the British
government being in favor of Zionist goals, and makes no mention of the United States
getting into the war, so I'm going to have to dismiss this claim since it was asserted
without any evidence.
Later Dennis tries to claim that it was the Jews who started a fight with Germany, which
is a claim you will hear surprisingly often in the far-right circles.
JF: There is a war of American Jewry, and international Jewry, against the German regime,
is that correct?
GOODRICH: Yes, it started for the most part, at least in the book, in 1933 when Adolf Hitler
was elected to German Chancellorship, and world-wide Jewry decided to go to war with
Germany – economic war at that time…
PROBLEM GENE: Dennis refers to the same boycott against Germany and how it was reported in
a certain tabloid as "Jews declaring war on Germany".
Obviously a boycott of German goods was completely different from the literal meaning of 'declaring
war', and this tabloid headline wasn't even a statement on behalf of any Jewish people.
What Dennis forgets to mention, is that this boycott was a response to the violence
[committed] against German Jews.
After that we get some attempts to downplay the anti-Semitism of the Third Reich by first
bringing up the Haavara Agreement.
The context behind the Haavara agreement was very briefly mentioned in the clips that Dennis
showed, but it should be emphasized so that nobody will believe that the Haavara agreement
was in anyway inconsistent with what we understand about the Third Reich.
The Haavara agreement, which was to ease Jewish migration to Palestine, was mainly intended
to stabilize the relationships between Germany and the Zionist organizations, so that the
economic effects of the boycotts could be neutralized.
Extermination wouldn't become a possible method of dealing with Jews until mid-1941,
but up to that point, using comparatively peaceful means to force German Jews to leave
their own country was how the NSDAP tried to deal with its perceived Jewish problem
– shows how much you can trust anti-Semites who call for "peaceful" ethnic cleansing.
Dennis then points out that there were people of Jewish origin in the army and party ranks,
such as the people you are seeing now.
Notice something?
All of the people mentioned were half-Jewish, including this one, whose connections to Hitler
were severed in 1931.
MARCUS: If you still harbor these [sorts] of delusions, then ask yourself this; why
in the name of God [were] there so many Jews who supported Hitler, and who joined the Wehrmacht
during World War 2, if this was something against all Jews?
PROBLEM GENE: The answer for that is quite simple; half-Jews were not considered Jewish.
They were Mischling, half-breed, and for as long as they didn't act like Jews, by practicing
the Jewish faith for example, they were allowed to live in relative freedom, and "mixed-race"
people were not at first restricted from serving in the military.
MARCUS: We've all seen the "bad side" of Adolf Hitler…
I'd suggest that you have a glimpse at the "good sides", as it were.
I will link "The Greatest Story Never Told" below, so [that] you can get an alternative
view of things.
PROBLEM GENE: Part 5 gives information about the aftermath of World War 1, which is pretty
accurate, but then the documentary takes a sudden turn to historical revisionism of the
lowest kind, by trying to portray Poland as the aggressor of the next war…
Dennis claims that there were massacres and other oppression against the ethnic Germans
living in Poland – another example of Dennis citing Third Reich propaganda as his source.
JF: …was [Hitler] dominating – in an imperialist sense – Poland, or did he just want to protect
Germany?
GOODRICH: I think, from what I've read – I want to be as honest, and accurate and as
historical as I possibly can but if…
What nation would not be angry at the treatment of its citizens, as German citizens were in
Poland prior to the outbreak of war?
From what I've read (Nazi propaganda) it was virtually a massacre!
PROBLEM GENE: It's very much possible that some kind of ethnic discrimination was practiced
against the Germans, but the stories of the ethnic German population of Poland being terrorized
and attacked are universally regarded as wild exaggerations or pure fiction.
Perhaps, if there had been violence against the ethnic Germans on a noticeable scale,
Germany could have pointed to a specific one and used it as a pretext for their invasion,
rather than having to stage false-flag attacks, yet false-flag attacks were what Germany had
to result to.
On August 22nd, Hitler gave a speech to his generals in which, among other things, the
deteriorating economic situation in Germany was mentioned as one of the reasons for the
invasion of Poland, and Hitler also said, when alluding to the propaganda pretext for
the invasion, that they will not be asked whether they told the truth about why they
started the war for as long as they come out as the victors.
Ironically, Dennis put this quote onto the cover of his documentary, but given the context,
it actually implies that Hitler knew that the propaganda pretext they offered for the
war was not true.
Then we get some more German victimhood narrative, now spiced with some appeal to emotion, which
is done by showing pictures of dead bodies.
The Bloody Sunday was when the ethnic Germans in the Polish city of Bromberg staged an uprising
after the invasion, which was put down harshly by the Poles, killing about 300 Germans.
While not "one of the most heinous of crimes to be inflicted upon a civilian population"
(like Dennis claimed), it was a war crime, and so were the other "revenge killings" that
took place amongst the panic and fear that followed the German invasion – up to 5 000
ethnic Germans were killed in total.
These numbers were exaggerated in German propaganda in order to justify their own murder campaign.
Dennis, not only never mentions any German atrocities, but he also uses the figures invented
by German propaganda.
The next segment comes with the insinuation that it was unfair of Britain and France to declare war
only on Germany, since the Soviet Union attacked Poland as well.
Germany invaded Poland the 1st of September, Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later,
and the Soviet Union did not attack until 17th of September, and while they did also have plenty of
excuses to offer, the Soviets had not undergone their own Czechoslovakia ordeal,
which could have demonstrated them to have been as belligerent as Germany.
If we look at the casualty statistics for Poland, we'll see that about 4 million Polish civilians were murdered by
the Germans, while one or two hundred thousand Polish civilians were murdered by the Soviets.
These are facts worth keeping in mind.
As despicable as the Soviet actions in Poland and the Western responses [to them] were,
they're not in the slightest evidence of any dreadful hypocrisy on the part of the Western powers,
which is by the way one of the most subtle Third Reich apologetics that people who sympathize with
with that regime might try to pull off.
Dennis then tries to portray the UK as the real warmonger for rejecting Germany's peace offers.
There's nothing suspicious about Britain turning down the offers, since
Germany's behavior towards Poland and Czechoslovakia had
showed that Germany under Hitler is not a regime that can be trusted.
We're at part 7 now, by the way, and Dennis tries to paint the Soviet Union as a threat
to Germany, and the German invasion of the Soviet Union – Operation Barbarossa, as
a justified pre-emptive strike.
His blatant hypocrisy in swallowing every story the Germans offered as justification
for their invasions of Poland and Czechoslovakia, but then presenting the Soviet invasions as
a cause for serious concern, speaks volumes about his biases…
The bombing of Sweden happened during the Winter War when the Soviets were trying to
bomb a city in Finland, but in a real grade-A fuck up the Soviet air forces bombed a Swedish
city by mistake.
No one died, and the Soviets later payed Sweden for the damages, so this wasn't an example
of the Soviets "expanding" towards the West, like Dennis so fraudulently claimed.
Stalin's motivations behind the annexations were a mix of opportunistic expansionism and
security concerns; Stalin was paranoid about the Baltic Sea and the Finnish border which
was very close to Leningrad, so – especially after the Finns had received aid from Germans,
he became worried that these places could be used as springboards for an attack against
Russia.
Thus negotiations with Finland began, and Stalin was willing to make generous land concessions
in order to have the Finnish border moved farther away from Leningrad.
Due to the Finns' mistrust of Russia, their former imperial master, and the Finnish government's
bureaucracy the negotiations stretched, and Stalin got impatient and attacked.
The Finns put up a good fight, all things considered, but eventually their military
came on the verge of collapse, which offered Stalin the opportunity to overrun the entire
country – he didn't.
In the fall of 1939, the Soviets installed military bases in the other Baltic States,
but did not intervene in their domestic affairs since Stalin expected that the counties would
"self-Sovietize".
Once Stalin realized that this wasn't going to happen, he took over the places by force
in the summer of 1940.
The fall of France in late June 1940 offered the Soviets another chance to expand their
"revolution" by occupying Romanian territory, which was, as Germany's demands revealed,
an issue for Germany largely because of the ethnic German populations and resources of
the areas.
Hitler couldn't have considered the Baltic States vital, from the perspective of his
national defense, since he had all of the places signed into the Soviet sphere of influence.
Hitler had also said that the USSR will not enter the war on its own accord, and he took
all of these Soviet annexations as a sign of weakness, but the Soviet Foreign Minister's
visit to Germany in late 1940 altered Hitler's thinking on this issue – we'll pick up
where we left off here during part 8.
Now let's see how honestly Dennis will portray Stalin and his regime...
NARRATOR: Stalin came to power on the death of Lenin, and ruled the Soviet Union by fear
and torture for nearly the next 30 years.
During that time, he was responsible for some 40 million deaths.
PROBLEM GENE: The stark contrast in the choice of music alone should tell you that you can't
trust any of the information provided here.
The intention is to try to get the viewer to sympathize with the German invasion of
the Soviet Union, or to further establish the Western Allies as evil hypocrites for
teaming up with a monster like Stalin while declaring war on a supposed angel like Hitler,
or both.
The "40 million deaths" is actually much closer to what Hitler is responsible for,
not Stalin.
NARRATOR: Eventually that catastrophe that Lenin had described as the most useful for
Communism raised its head again – famine.
PROBLEM GENE: I wonder if that refers to Lenin's 1912 essay called "Famine", in which Lenin
wrote that one good thing about famine is people becoming disillusioned by the nature
of the Tsarist rule – this sure wouldn't be as menacing as the documentary made it
sound like it was.
NARRATOR: In Ukraine alone, 6 million people starved over the next few years…
PROBLEM GENE: 6 million certainly didn't die in Ukraine, if that's what the guy meant.
The total number of deaths from the 1931-3 Soviet famine might be close to that, but
the number of Ukrainian victims, specifically, might be 3 and half a million.
This is part 8; Dennis comes back to the notion of Operation Barbarossa being a pre-emptive
strike, and the USSR being about to attack Germany.
He mentions a book by name this time, why he doesn't do that with his other claims
I'm not sure, but let's investigate this book by Victor Suvorov...
VOX DAY: …it's a book by a gentleman by the name of Victor Suvorov […] it's almost
irrefutable that not only was Stalin intending to attack, but I think that it is…
PETERSON: …and Hitler invaded the Soviet Union anyway, and from what I've been able
to understand, the Soviets had prepared an invasion force for Europe at that point, but
were not concerned with having to defend their territory…
[Sorry about the lag.]
PROBLEM GENE: Suvorov seems to think that the fact that the USSR possessed troops and
military vehicles intended for offensive operations is evidence of the USSR's plan to invade,
but he has horrifically overlooked the fact that the Soviet military doctrine had long
been predicated on counteroffensives and so-called "forward defense".
This fundamental misunderstanding becomes more evident when Suvorov makes a huge deal
about the parachute troops and how they are useless in a defensive war, he even claims
without a citation that the USSR had more than a million of them, however, four years
before the war the Red Army did practice a counteroffensive in which these paratroopers
were deployed.
All though France was in poor relations with the USSR at the time, the French general who
was invited to witness the exercises did not observe anything worrisome or shady about
the characteristics of the army.
He even concluded that the army would be effective at countervailing objectives.
Suvorov makes a big deal too about how the Soviets were moving troops towards the Western
border in early 1941, and he believes that this too indicates an invasion plan, but these
mobilizations were simply a part of the plan that intended to put the Soviet troops into
positions where they could respond to a German attack, and also at the turn of the year,
Soviet spies in Germany had received information about an upcoming German invasion happening
in March of 1941.
The date turned out to be wrong, obviously, and it would later be believed to have been
changed to May of that year.
Suvorov then points to the lack of defensive properties in the Soviet troops near the border,
and assumes that these must have been an invasion force.
He's unfortunately unaware of the fact that, in accordance with the Soviet military doctrine,
counteroffensives were the mission of these deployed troops, so naturally they didn't
adopt the traditional defensive positions that Suvorov thinks that they should have.
I won't be going through Suvorov's entire book – I just wanted to explain his main
misunderstandings.
Another thing to take into consideration is that in the 1930s the Soviets believed that
they were facing threats from pretty much all directions, and indeed they believed that
many of these countries would attack at some point.
This means that there's also a good chance that their uncertainty about where the attack was
going to come from would be reflected in their preparations.
Unlike what Suvorov and Dennis would have you believe, the Soviet army was nowhere near
ready for a major offensive – the Soviets were untrained and unprepared – which was
made evident by the Soviet performance in the war against Finland.
Suvorov appears to be aware of this fact of the Soviets being unprepared, since in his
book he tries to dismiss this "fact" as Communist professors manipulating statistics.
Here he also claims that the Soviet army was bigger than historians would have you believe,
because they do not count the supposed NKVD troops which the USSR had about one hundred
thousand.
This claim is offered without a citation, he simply asserts that "this is the truth",
but the Soviets already had over 5 million soldiers so a 100 000 extra troops wouldn't
have been much of a game changer even if we were to assume that they existed.
In May 1941 Stalin's top Marshals were putting together a plan which envisaged a pre-emptive
strike against Germany, but by then no actual preparations for such a strike had been made,
and Stalin dismissed outright the possibility of a pre-emptive strike against Germany, since
he likely feared that [a pre-emptive stirke] would result in Britain making peace with Germany, and the
two joining forces against the Soviet Union.
What's more likely than an invasion, is that the Soviets wanted to wait until the
war was at an end, and then impose their will on the weakened Europe.
Whether they would have done that by using military force or by just supporting revolutionary
movements like they did in Spain and China is very difficult to say.
Coincidentally Dennis's account of Operation Barbarossa is the same that the Third Reich
propaganda adopted in the month following the invasion.
The truth is more complicated...
In October 1940 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, was invited to Berlin to discuss
the formation of an anti-British coalition.
Regardless what may have been the actual reason for the invitation, Molotov came to Berlin
in November.
The Germans tried to direct the Soviet interests towards Asia, but the Soviets, who had vastly
overestimated their leverage, expressed interest in more European territories, which Hitler
could not allow.
The Soviet interests in Eastern Europe meant that major military action in Western Europe
was off the table for Hitler since the Soviets might try to annex more territories if the
German troops were pulled away from there, so in the light of this, Germany's weakening
economic situation, the USSR growing stronger, and the United States getting closer to being
able to intervene, time was running out for Hitler, and he was left with very few options;
two of them entailed a continuing alliance with the Soviets, and one entailed the invasion
of the Soviet Union, which in itself might have forced Britain to surrender, and would
have guaranteed that Germany can't get caught in a two-front war in the case Britain doesn't
surrender and the US joins the war.
The invasion might have seemed the riskiest option, but as the German Propaganda Minister's
diary entries illustrate, both he – Goebbels – and Hitler viewed the Soviet military
as weak and untrained.
When the actual invasion was near, Goebbels predicted that Russia would collapse like
a house of cards, and Hitler also expected a quick victory.
For almost two decades the Bolshevist-Soviet Union had been Hitler's most hated enemy,
and in his view their "alliance" couldn't last forever.
Now that Hitler knew about the Soviet aspirations in Europe, he began to consider the USSR a
threat on the rise which should be destroyed before it got strong.
Goebbels agreed; the Soviet Union and the Third Reich couldn't exist side by side
for long, so the confrontation should take place when the Soviets were not yet ready for it.
After Molotov's visit the decision to attack Russia was made, and it was made under the
pretext that this would ensure German mastery over Europe, and shatter Britain's last
hope in Europe – this had to be done before the US could intervene.
On the 4th of December Hitler had agreed with the Propaganda Minister in a private conversation
that Russia wouldn't take any action against Germany, and two weeks later the plan to crush
Soviet Russia was declared in Hitler's war directive.
In early January 1941 Hitler expanded on his argument for Barbarossa, which was mainly
about the British surrendering that would not happen for as long as the possibility
of Russian intervention existed, and avoiding the difficult situation that would arise if
both the US and the USSR were to help Britain.
Hitler demonstrated again in late January 1941 that he understood that Stalin had no
intentions of attacking – a perception that turned out to be correct, but Hitler's worry
was that this would change if Germany were to become weak.
Such a belief might have made sense from Hitler's point of view, given his dislike of and paranoia
about the USSR, which must have been only intensified by the situation Hitler had chosen
to place himself in by making deals with the Soviets and attacking Poland despite warnings
from the Brits that they could not allow that, all though the Soviets did not have plans
to invade Germany, and as we have seen, Stalin even considered such an option too risky,
so make of that what you will…
Next, Dennis tries to portray the German army as some noble liberators of Ukraine, by using
the anecdotes of one person; Ingrid Zündel.
ZÜNDEL: It was like heaven!
My mother, to the day she died, never stopped talking about the wonderful two years that
she had when the German army came […] they took all the houses – we gave them gladly!
It was magnificent!
And we are absolutely convinced…
PROBLEM GENE: Not a very reliable witness in my humble opinion, for one thing she was
about 6 years old at the time, and to make things even worse, later in her life she became
friends with a notorious Holocaust denier whom she then married.
Yeah, forgive me if I don't let her personal testimony override all historical evidence.
The Germans were not the saviors of Ukraine; you can often hear Nazi sympathizers pretending
to care about the Ukrainians that were horrifically killed by Stalin, but they never mention the
millions of Ukrainians that were killed by the German invasion and occupation.
After that, we get to hear, or read about how Hitler couldn't have been a racist because
he allied with an anti-Jewish cleric wasn't of European ethnicity, but wanted to destroy
the Jewish settlements in Palestine.
Dennis also evinces the fact that Germany had people of other ethnicities and nationalities
fighting for them.
This indeed seems to have been contrary to what was written in Mein Kampf about the military having
to be in touch with the unity of the national being, but they had common enemies with Germany;
usually Communists, Americans or the British.
I'll talk briefly about the "diversity" in the SS...
At first only people considered to be "Germanic" were permitted to volunteer for the Waffen-SS,
which was by the way the armed military division of the SS, but given how few people actually
volunteered, the racial profile that SS members were required to fit was loosened, all though
the head of the SS – Heinrich Himmler would always maintain that the alien ethnic groups
in the SS were not to be considered equals.
In early 1943, about a year and half after recruitment using the loosened racial criteria
had begun, the first Muslim division for the Waffen-SS was created.
Himmler thought of these Muslims as disposable, and his ostensible respect for Islam, as it
was taught to the few Waffen-SS divisions, amounted to not much more than valuing their
willingness to fight to the death in a belief that they will go to paradise.
There was no shortage of real enemies the Third Reich shared with the Muslims in the
Balkans, since Yugoslavia had the most powerful pro-Soviet forces in Europe, but it was the
imaginary enemies that ultimately linked these two together.
As Himmler explained a bit less than a year after the first Muslim division was formed,
these Muslims shared Hitler's goal of wanting to rid the whole world of Jews.
I declare this mystery solved.
The Muslim Waffen-SS divisions did not prove to be useful, and they often rebelled against
SS authority, thus these groups were disbanded less than two years after this project had
begun.
Part 12 is when we get the first Holocaust denial arguments; turns out that the wife
of the Holocaust denier just might be a Holocaust denier -- what a plot-twist!
ZUNDEL: …so when I hear about the shower heads, the Holocaust and all that, I know
exactly why that was!
That was soap and water raining down on us to delouse us!
PROBLEM GENE: These arguments, if you want to call them that will return in one form
or another a bit later in the documentary – I'll deal with this then.
All though, at this point I have about two thirds of my script left, so I think I should
stop here and release part 2 as soon as I finish it.
If you think this documentary has been dishonest and outrageous so far, well you haven't
seen anything yet – it will get much worse.
But for now, please leave a comment, share this if you didn't think it was that bad,
or if you want your friends to have a laugh at me as well, leave a like or a dislike,
and consider subscribing – I would appreciate it.
Thank you for watching, really, and I hope to see you next time!
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