In mid-september 2000 a Russian cargo ship on passage from Riga Latvia to pool
UK with a cargo of sawn timber and bundles of pallet timber was about 70
miles north-northwest of the Hook of Holland in the southern North Sea a
seaman who was working in the fo'c'sle went aft saying he was going to the
bathroom about 15 or 20 minutes later the bosun who was also working forward
also went aft as he passed down the port side of number 2 hold he noticed the
deck cargo tarpaulin lashings were undone and the tarpaulin had been lifted
back he looked closer and found the hatch cover to number two hold
access shaft wedged open at the bottom of the shaft he saw the first seaman's
body the bosun immediately raised the alarm and called for assistance when
help arrived the bosun donned a self-contained breathing apparatus and
entered the shaft with other crew members supporting his efforts from
outside the shaft the seaman was removed to deck
but despite prolonged attempts at resuscitation he could not be revived
when the ship arrived in pool the police and the British marine Accident
Investigation Branch investigated the incident before cargo operations were
commenced atmospheric tests were taken on the access shaft where the seamen had
been found very low levels of oxygen together with high levels of carbon
monoxide were recorded with Police Fire Brigade and customs officials in
attendance the deck cargo was removed and the holes were opened apart from a
distinctive smell there was no evidence of fire or any chemical reaction either
in the access shaft or in the cargo itself there were no technical or
operational reasons for the seamen to have entered the shaft he had not been
instructed to do so by the bosun or by any officer on board it was concluded
that he had made a personal decision to enter and for an unknown reason the
cause of death was most probably due to the low oxygen and high carbon monoxide
levels present in the access shaft to number 2 hold at the time the victim
entered the space timber cargoes are a recognized source of oxygen depletion
and carbon monoxide generation in enclosed spaces
on the 22nd of July 1991 the Netherlands flag livestock vessel zebu Express was
lying at anchor in Darwin Harbour the master and second officer had gone
ashore and the chief officer was in temporary charge as work started in the
morning the chief engineer and second engineer began working in the bow
thruster compartment cleaning the electrical motor there had been a small
water leak and the motor had got wet early in the afternoon the chief
engineer observed the second engineer to be in physical difficulty in the lower
part of the compartment he climbed out onto the deck raised the alarm and then
returned inside to assist the second engineer descending to the lower
compartment without a breathing apparatus both the chief engineer and
the second engineer collapsed in the lower part of the bow thruster
compartment attempt to rescue the two men were made by the assistant engineer
wearing a self-contained compressed air breathing apparatus and supported by
other members of the crew on deck but he was unable to effect a rescue
the bodies of the chief engineer and second engineer were eventually
recovered from the bow thruster compartment by members of the Darwin
Fire Service a surveyor of the Australian Maritime
Safety Authority conducted an investigation into the incident under
the provisions of the navigation Act the deaths of the two engineers resulted
from their failure to follow the well-publicized safety procedures for
safe entry into and rescue from enclosed spaces the second engineer died of
asphyxia being overcome by accumulated toxic vapors from the electrical cleaner
being used in a confined enclosed space without adequate ventilation the chief
engineer likewise died from asphyxia from the
vapors but this would not have happened if he had recognised the hazards and
donned the breathing apparatus the 12,000 573 gross register tons US
flag tanker William T steel was preparing to load a cargo of benzene at
Gare nila Puerto Rico unfortunately due to a
planning oversight in the manifold rigging the cargo was inadvertently
loaded into the wrong tank number nine Center which had been reserved for a
cargo of xylene there was no chance of working with the wrong stowage so the
benzene was transferred out a number nine Center was washed and ventilated
two crewmen entered the forward end of number nine center to insert an
isolation blank in a flange in a pipeline and the chief officer went to
the after part of the tank to eject water from the sump area the two crew
men working forward were unaware of the presence of the chief officer when the
flanges in the line were cracked benzene began to leak out and the fumes forced
the two crewmen to leave the compartment without completing their task
once on deck one of the crewmen looked back down into the tank and saw the
chief officer lying in the bottom the alarm was raised and the second officer
and several other crewmen entered the space without breathing apparatus to
rescue the chief officer by this time the master had arrived on deck and he
donned the breathing apparatus and followed the others into the tank when
he reached the second officer some way down into the tank he noticed that he
was experiencing difficulty in breathing and attempted to share his air supply as
he tried to pass the mask over both men felled the remaining distance to the
bottom of the tank seeing this the other crewman immediately exited the tank they
survived but all three officers died the subsequent investigation by the US
National Transportation Safety Board concluded that both the chief officer
and second officer died from prolonged exposure to the highly concentrated
benzene vapors and the master died from the same cause but also possibly due to
injuries sustained in the fall
this incident occurred on a tween-deck dry cargo vessel which was fitted with
several deep tanks designed for the carriage of vegetable oil cargoes she
was on a return run to Europe having called at various small island ports in
the South Pacific where she had loaded palm oil in several of the deep tanks
access trunks led from the main deck on each side between number one and number
two hatches two lobbies at tween-deck level in each lobby there was a bolted
manhole cover at the top of the appropriate deep tank the deep tanks
were protectively coated and fitted with stainless steel heating coils to
maintain the cargo temperature during the voyage and to raise it prior to
discharge the palm oil was discharged in hull England and the tanks were
subsequently ballasted with seawater for the next passage to the South Pacific no
cleaning was done after the discharge of the palm oil and the ballast was loaded
directly on top of the remaining palm oil residue some 10 to 12 days into the
voyage a crewman was taking routine tank soundings when he noticed a bad smell
emanating from the sounding pipes for number two and number three deep tanks
this was not unusual and regarded as a normal feature of the carriage of
ballast water in these tanks but he did report the matter to the chief officer
following company requirements the ballast water was changed after passing
through the Panama Canal D ballasting commenced during the afternoon of the
2nd of October during the evening watch the same day the two engineer cadets
were sent forward by the second engineer to check on the water levels in number
two and number three tanks as the ballast pump had lost suction the cadets
first checked number two tank by going down the access trunk to the tween-deck
level and opening a steel screw down inspection port in the manhole lid
having established that the ballast seemed to be out they reimagined open
the door of the access trunk to number three tank and the pump room here they
found a foul smell of such strength that they decided it was unsafe to enter and
reported back to the second engineer on the assumption that all the ballast
water was out both tanks were rebalanced
after rebalancing however the smell from the air pipes of both tanks did not
improve a fleet circular from the company drew
attention to the possible dangers of hydrogen sulfide gas evolving from
decomposing palm oil in ballast water and requesting masters to ensure that
ballast water is changed at sea and that under no circumstances was access to the
tanks or pump rooms to be allowed until entry procedures had been followed and
an entry permit issued the circular had reportedly been discussed on board at a
recent safety meeting but this had not been minuted
a number of tanks were emptied and cleaned as the passage progressed on the
morning of the 21st of October the chief officer asked the second engineer to
pump the ballast out of number two and number three tanks to semen were
instructed to remove the lids from the tanks in the tween-deck lobbies at about
oh seven hundred hours the Bangladeshi DEXA rang reported to the bridge to
discuss the work for that day the chief officer anticipated that the two tanks
will be empty by early afternoon and discussed preparations for tank cleaning
with the Sarang there was evidently some confusion however and it is possible
that the DEXA rang had misunderstood when the tanks would actually be empty
when they turned to at a 800 hours the DEXA rang went forward with five men to
the tank access trunks they rigged a hose and prepared a cargo cluster light
the Dix rang and warned seamen went down the access trunk of the starboard side
leading to the tween-deck lobby where the manhole access to number three deep
tank had been opened earlier the DEXA rang entered the tank
almost immediately the semen at the manhole shouted up the access trunk
sarang fall down he then entered the tank himself and the other man on deck
heard him calling Sarang Sarang from inside the tank then it went quiet at
around Oh 850 hours the third officer on watch on the bridge heard shouting on
the deck at the same time another seaman alerted the chief officer and he ran
forward he issued instructions for self-contained breathing apparatus to be
brought from the safety Locker without waiting for it to arrive however he also
entered the trunk he was wearing a boiler suit but no self-contained
breathing apparatus and had not stopped to put boots on a seaman also went in
but only got a little way and came back out on deck due to the strong smell of
gas a few moments later the master arrived closely followed by a seaman
bringing a self-contained breathing apparatus the mast had donned the
breathing apparatus and descended to between deck level where he found the
hose and cargo cluster which had been rigged earlier he saw the chief officer
slumped on a stringer plate below the manhole but could not see the others he
considered that he was unable to assist on his own and returned to the deck
the chief engineer and second engineer had now arrived on the scene and also
Don's self-contained breathing apparatus sets they entered and descended with an
emergency oxygen supply they located the chief officer and started to administer
the oxygen as the chief engineer lifted the chief officer to a more upright
position he noticed another man hanging upside
down from the stringer plate with one leg caught in the ladder later
identified as the sarong a stretcher was lowered but put aside by the two
engineers as being ineffective in the circumstances shortly after this a
self-contained breathing apparatus low level alarm sounded but the two
engineers were unable to identify which set it was coming from they decided it
was safest for both of them to exit and by the time they reached the deck both
alarms were sounding spare bottles had been organized by the master and the
chief engineer this time accompanied by the second officer returned inside
wearing fresh scents the second engineer went to get still more cylinders
the chief engineer took a line with him that was rigged through a block at the
top of the access trunk he attached it to the chief officer and an attempt was
made by those on deck to lift him out the line intended for lowering tools was
not strong enough and parted the chief officer falling back down and landing on
a stringer plate the chief engineer secured the line a second time but then
had to exit the space due to a low level alarm sounding on his second set of
bottles a third fresh supply was provided and the chief engineer again
returned to the bottom of the trunk this time he took a lifeline with him and
secured that as well the chief officer was eventually lifted out onto deck at
around ten hundred hours resuscitation and cardiac massage were attempted by
the master and purser but were abandoned when it became apparent that there was
no sign of life as there was no chance of the DEXA wrong
or the semen inside the tank being alive the master decided not to risk further
personnel and ordered the D ballasting should continue with a view to
recovering the other bodies when the tank was empty the mixture of palm oil
residues and salt water had led to the generation of hydrogen sulfide gas and
corresponding oxygen depletion with in the deep tank and in the vicinity of the
tween-deck lobby after removal of the manhole lid which claimed the lives of
the chief officer the DEXA rang and the semen
the Hong Kong registered bulk carrier nigo Kim arrived off the port of Dampier
in the early hours of Saturday the 17th of November 2001 and anchored to await
birthing instructions she remained at anchor over the weekend during which
time the crew continued scheduled maintenance work including the
preparation of the interior of number one port topside ballast tank for
painting at about 1300 hours on Sunday the chief officer tested the atmosphere
inside the tank for oxygen content in accordance with standard enclosed space
entry procedures at about 1430 hours the eight-man deck crew started work
painting the steel work inside the tank one man was using an airless spray
painting gun while the other crewman maintained the paint reservoir tended a
cargo light load through the after manhole and generally assisted the
painter as required ventilation of the tank was achieved by an open-ended
compressed air hose led from the fo'c'sle along the deck and down through
this after manhole and an electrically driven fan positioned at an angle over
the after manhole which also provided access for the paint hose light cable
and a lanyard the chief officer supervised the initial
stages of the task the paint used was a two-part epoxy mix thinned as needed
using the thinner product supplied by the paint manufacturer according to the
chief officer the volume of thinner used was between 30% and 50% of the total
mixture at about 1530 hours the chief officer went to the bridge to start his
anchor watch leaving the bosun and Dec fitter in charge at the tank at about 16
40 hours a large explosion ripped through the tank three men were blown
down the length of the main deck killing them all instantly four others were
blown over the side one man who had been inside the tank was still alive but
severely burned he was assisting out of the tank through the ruptured main deck
plating and airlifted ashore but later died from his injuries a search and
rescue operation recovered the body of one seaman but the others were never
found
the investigation concluded that the air vapor ratio in particular stemming from
the paint thinner had developed into an explosive atmosphere and that it had
come into contact with a source of ignition it wasn't able to positively
identify that source other than to say it was within the compartment the
electrical lighting a VHF radio or a spark carried down from the electric fan
could all have been possibilities as could a falling tool or a cigarette
lighter it was noted that the prevailing good weather conditions would have
increased the temperature inside the tank to around 38 degrees Celsius which
was above the ignition temperature of the thinners although below the auto
ignition temperature analysis of the rate of delivery of fresh air revealed
that it was insufficient to prevent the atmosphere entering the flammable range
and that not being fitted with a trunking to carry the air to the lower
part of the space only the upper region of the tank was being ventilated
on the 4th of September 2001 the chemical tanker rhine stern was anchored
off rotterdam awaiting cargo borders even though there were no instructions
the master decided to prepare the tanks anyway the previous cargo had been
naphtha because of the vapor density of the product the plan was to ventilate
the tanks and then eject the cargo residues collecting them in a slop tank
no water cleaning was planned ventilation was achieved by a flexible
large bore trunking connected to the deck ventilation line and inserted
through an adjacent tank cleaning hatch the trunking was only pushed inside the
top of the tank and not lowered down to the bottom the tank lid was kept only
cracked open in order to create a slight back pressure in the space in order to
eject the tanks then all procedure was for a man to enter the tank and put the
ejector pump suction hose into the sump directly under the foot of the deep well
cargo pump the first tank to be ejected was number 8 starboard and the chief
officer tested the atmosphere at around 10:30 hours recording 15 to 25 percent
LEL and 20% oxygen content
chief officer had given instructions that self-contained breathing apparatus
was to be used in the tank entry but he later observed a number of the crew
exiting tank number 8 starboard after ejecting wearing filter masks the chief
officer spoke to one of the men who stated that they preferred to use the
filter masks because the SCBA sets were heavy and awkward to use were continued
through the day and the chief officer later left the deck to get some rest
at around 1635 hours the crew turned their attention to tank number 6 port
the tank was not tested before entry the assumption being made that conditions
would be the same as in number 8 starboard the deck cadet had by now
arrived on deck and was assigned as watchman three crewmen went into the
tank want to place and tend the suction hose and to to squeegee or sweep any
remaining product towards the sump at around 1645 hours the DECA debt saw one
of the men down the tank collapse he immediately informed the second officer
on the bridge and the general alarm was sounded the master quickly appeared on
the bridge but discovering the situation he went down onto deck straightaway on
the way he met the third officer and instructed him to collect a rescue line
and harness from the afterdeck store
meanwhile one of the two crew members still standing in tank number six port
left the tank to get a breathing apparatus while the other crew member
stayed with the man who had collapsed as the man arrived on deck the deck cadet
took the filter mask from him put it on and entered the tank himself to take a
breathing apparatus set down once he had handed it over he returned to the deck
the man who had stayed inside fitted the mask to the casualty and opened the air
supply valve establishing at the same time that he was breathing the crewman
who had left the tank now returned wearing a self-contained breathing
apparatus and took over from his shipmate who had been wearing only a
filter mask throughout the incident as he exited the tank the master took the
filter mask from him put it on and entered the tank he tried to move the
collapsed man but he found him too heavy gave up the attempt and climbed back out
onto deck
by this time both equipment and men had started to arrive on scene including the
harness line and a resuscitator two more men Don self-contained breathing
apparatus and went down inside the tank the harness was lowered and fitted to
the casualty who was then hauled out onto deck during this recovery operation
the master collapsed on deck the second officer contacted the Netherlands Coast
Guard from the bridge and requested medical assistance after some discussion
it was agreed that the Rhine Stern should heave anchor and proceed towards
the entrance to the port in order to minimize further delays and a helicopter
would be mobilized in the meantime repeated and prolonged attempts were
made to revive the master and care was administered to the man who had been
brought out of the tank at 1830 hours the helicopter arrived bringing a doctor
the master was pronounced dead at the scene the man who had collapsed in the
tank spent the night in hospital ashore but returned to the vessel the following
day it is standard practice that shore
personnel usually want to start working a ship as soon as it comes alongside
this situation has been somewhat controlled since the introduction of
security practices in recent years the vessel in this incident had loaded a
cargo of round wood logs in West Africa and arrived to discharge them in a port
in southern Spain the holes had remained shut due to poor weather in the Atlantic
and no ventilation had been carried out as soon as she was alongside the crew of
shore side stevedores were on board to commence work the ship's deck crew began
opening the hatch to hold number two and the number of stevedores was seen to
enter down the access ladder at the after end of the hold
on reaching the top layer of the cargo one man was seen to slip and fall into a
gap between two large logs seeing him drop three of his colleagues rushed to
the spot and attempted to rescue him they too collapsed one of them also
slipping down into the gap the second officer who was watching from the deck
above raised the alarm and the port safety officials and local Fire Brigades
soon arrived the problem of rescue was compounded by the added risk of movement
to the cargo if any one log was moved to gain access to the casualties underneath
two men were recovered relatively quickly but surrounding logs had to be
secured in place and several pieces of timber lifted carefully care to get to
the others one man had fallen down between the logs to a depth of around
3.5 meters it took almost an hour to bring all four men out of the hold and
all were declared dead on arrival at hospital logs where the bark has been
stripped off unknown to be dangerously slippery freshly cut logs are also known
to deplete oxygen in enclosed spaces and the hole had not been ventilated these
two factors contributed to the deaths of the four men
the Sapphire was a chemical tanker of 14,000 and two deadweight tons built in
1997 she had loaded 16 parcels of chemical products at US Gulf ports to
being discharged at two ports in Turkey and the remainder for discharge in Haifa
Israel the ship sail from Amberleigh in Turkey on the afternoon of the 23rd of
April 1999 bound for Haifa after clearing the port it was planned
to clean number to center tank which had contained linear alkyl benzene and
number six Center tank that had contained HMD hexamethylenediamine
solid number six Center had been purged with nitrogen prior to loading in the US
Gulf although now diluted the tank still contained a mixture of nitrogen and air
and a nitrogen tag was attached to the lid the cleaning plan was discussed
between the master chief officer and the pump man and involved machine washing
both tanks for forty five minutes with salt water followed by a 20-minute
freshwater rinse then leaving them venting overnight prior to mopping the
next morning the washing was carried out by the pump man and three crew members
from 16:45 hours until dinner at 1800 hours over the meal the pump man
dismissed the sailors who had been assisting with the operation and then
returned to the deck with the crew boy to rig the ventilation equipment
at approximately 1950 hours the chief officer was doing his deck rounds and
noticed that the lid on number six center tank was fully open this was
unusual as the lid was normally just cracked during venting to keep a slight
overpressure in the tank looking inside he saw the deck boy lying
on the first platform of the access ladder approximately four meters down
into the tank he was wearing a filter mask was lying partly on his back and
slumped against the rails the pump man was further inside the tank and slumped
over the top safety hoop on the next ladder down with only his feet being
trapped under the platform stopping him falling to the tank bottom he
immediately ran after trying to raise the attention of the bridge personnel by
waving his torch the officers and crews recreation rooms were just inside the
accommodation door and the chief officer summoned all personnel present returning
to deck without actually setting off any general alarm signal breathing apparatus
and other equipment was quickly gathered and brought to the hatch of number-6
center tank
the chief officer was the first person to enter the tank but only wearing an
emergency escape breathing device that he had collected from the manifold
safety store he tried to lift the deck boy but this was not possible though he
did check for a pulse he could not detect anything at this time the third
engineer who had taken a self-contained breathing apparatus from the co2 room
station aft into the tank to assist unfortunately the chief officers low
pressure alarm now went off and he had to exit the tank the third engineer
momentarily came out to collect a safety harness and rope to attach to the deck
boy and the second engineer who was also by now equipped in an SCBA entered the
tank with him the restricted location that casualties
was proving a problem for the would-be rescuers and it was obvious that there
was not enough room for them all said the second engineer left to assist from
outside the third engineer attached the harness and the rope around the deck boy
and he was lifted out by the crew on deck the Rope was then transferred to
the pump man and he was also pulled to the deck with one man guiding the body
from below
attempts were made to revive both of the casualties but without success the
experience of the pump met the presence of a nitrogen tag on the lid and the
rigging of the ventilation equipment all point to the pump man understanding that
the atmosphere inside the tank was hazardous the deck boy had only been on
board for a month and it is reasonable to assume that he simply followed the
more senior man this ship was a nine thousand 695 deadweight tons chemical
tanker at the time of the incident she was engaged in tank cleaning
following discharge of a cargo of ethylene dichloride the center tanks was
stainless steel and the wing tanks had a zinc silicate coating the pump man and a
sailor were running the machine cleaning and the bosun was following behind with
another sailor starting ventilation fans as the washing finished and then
ejecting the remaining washing water from the after ends of the tanks the
first two tanks were tested by the chief officer but he then went to attend to
planning for the next cargo leaving the subsequent testing in the hands of the
boat who had received training in the use of testing equipment and was
approved as an operator under the vessels safety management system tank
number four sent to port was tested and 21% oxygen was found no evidence of
toxic gas was noted a green safe for entry tak was fitted to the lid and the
appropriate entry permit was filled out although it was added to a folder of
permits without the chief officers verification signature being obtained at
that time
the bosun entered the tank climbing down the access ladder while the Sailor
lowered the suction hose from the ejector pump through a cleaning hatch
above the sump he did not wear any breathing apparatus or carry an
emergency escape breathing device with him at the time the sea was calm and the
vessel had a considerable Stern trim and the slight list so quite a lot of water
was lying in the outboard after corner of the tank the bosun commenced removing
this water holding the section pipe at a slight angle to maintain the suction
after approximately two minutes and with around half of the water removed he got
a sudden blast of cargo vapor full in the face he immediately dropped the
ejector hose and ran towards the ladder catching his breath and with eyes
watering he climbed out of the tank more by feeling his way from rung to rung
than anything else the sailor on deck had seen the bosun running away and
already raised the alarm through his radio to the bridge the chief officer
had also heard the broadcast and was already halfway up the deck as the bosun
emerged through the hatch the bosun vomited over the side and then sat down
gradually recovering over the next 15 minutes or so the chief officer tested
the atmosphere in the tank for the record but the ventilation fan had
already stirred up the vapor to a noticeable level anyway it was found
that the cargo residue being of a greater density had settled beneath a
layer of water in the corner of the tank as the water was removed by the ejector
the product was exposed and the vapors were released the meter readings
obtained before entry were correct because the cargo residue was
effectively contained by the water and the air above had been successfully
purified by the ventilation fan the bosun was not aware of the risk of cargo
remaining and simply trusted the meter readings he did react when the
conditions changed but was lucky to escape from the tank without serious
injury this incident involves a chemical tanker
which had stainless steel center tanks with coated wing tanks on either side
her crew was comprised of men of several nationalities the ship was in ballast
and had just finished cleaning tanks they were in the final stages of mopping
and drying in preparation for the next cargo the chief officer who had been on
deck throughout was closely supervising the operation although the details of
the enclosed space entry permits are not available the tanks had however already
been guests freed the previous day and the deck crew had been inside for
ejecting and mopping the chief officer had also been inside all of them for
inspection
on the day of the incident the deck crew was divided into two teams of two seamen
each in order to speed up the final preparations it eventually became a
practice that they went in and out of the tanks with minimal supervision by
the chief officer or attendants from the deck the afternoon coffee break came and
the deck was suddenly deserted the officer on watch on the bridge saw dark
clouds approaching and his students started to rain heavily the watchman was
sent to inform the crew of the rain two men were sent on deck to close the tank
lids many of the tanks were almost in load ready condition and it was
important that they did not get rainwater inside the two men hurried
from lid to lid swinging them over and throwing the securing dogs on with a few
quick turns to each
the rain eventually passed and the pump man went out to once again check the
tanks he was halfway through tightening the dogs on number five sent a tank lid
when he heard a faint knocking coming from inside the tank he immediately
opened the lid back up and found the chief officer clinging onto the ladder
breathing heavily he had one safety shoe in his hand and was weakly banging at
the inside of the tank hatch luckily he was only suffering from shock and
fatigue failure to observe basic enclosed space entry procedures and the
independent actions of the chief officer primarily led to this near-miss incident
the gas carrier happy Falcon of 3366 gross register tons arrived alongside in
zebra gear Belgium early on the 10th of January 2003 and commenced preparations
for inerting and gas freeing operations the nitrogen was being supplied by Asher
side contractor the ship was to load a full cargo of propylene in her two tanks
number one tank had previously been loaded with raffinate 1 and required
inerting with nitrogen 2 below the lower explosive limit and then gas freeing the
tank was then to be inspected and if accepted by the severe purged again with
nitrogen prior to loading number 2 tank had previously contained propylene and
did not require inspection or purging at Oh 1:45 hours prior to inerting number 1
tank readings of the atmosphere in the tank
were taken and gas concentrations of 5.7% at the top 5.2 percent in the
middle and 3.7 percent at the bottom were observed hoses were connected at o2
oh five hours and the tank was depressurized to shore this was
completed at oh three thirty five hours and nitrogen was started into the tank
at oh three forty hours nitrogen was being supplied into the top of the tank
with the gas vapor being expelled out through the liquor
line in the bottom of the tank and to a flare on shore
readings were taken at intervals showing a progressive drop in the gas
concentration at a 8:30 hours nitrogen was stopped and the tank dome
lid was opened in preparation for inserting the Shore ventilation hose the
chief officer third officer and an a/b were attending to this task the a beyond
the jetty the third officer pulling the hose
towards the tank lid and the chief officer guiding it into position at the
lid the third officer was facing out towards the ship's side rail as he was
working and was not aware of the activity actually taking place at the
tank lid he heard a noise and turned around but could not see the chief
officer he moved towards the dome and looked down into the tank where he saw
the chief officer lying on the middle platform of the ladder
halfway down into the tank the third officer ran into the accommodation
raised the alarm shouted to the personnel present in the mess room
telephoned a bridge and made a broadcast on the PA system before returning to the
deck it was a 851 hours the a be returned on board and prepared
to enter the tank with a safety line the shore supervisor also climbed on board
and warned the a B not to enter without breathing apparatus personnel and
equipment were arriving on site however and the a bead on the self-contained
breathing apparatus and entered the tank the shore supervisor raised the alarm on
shore and call the emergency services at approximately Oh 8 55 hours the chief
officer supported by the a B from underneath was lifted using the safety
line and manhandled out onto deck the second officer commenced administering
oxygen and it was noted that the chief officer was still breathing
at this time however a noise was heard from inside the tank and it was found
that the a B had himself fallen and was lying on the same middle platform that
the chief officer had been rescued from an OS and the mess man
now donned the breathing apparatus and entered the tank with a safety line the
a B was retrieved to deck at Oh nine hundred hours but found not to be
breathing or to have a pulse efforts continued to revive him and Tynan
ambulance arrived and took both the chief officer and a B to hospital the a
B was declared dead some hours later when the life-support machine to which
he had been connected on arrival was finally switched off the chief officer
partially recovered and was repatriated to the Philippines it has never been
conclusively established whether the chief officer actually climbed into the
tank to position the ventilation hose fell into the tank from deck or slipped
and fell from a position at or near the top of the tank given the limited size
of the access hatch and the injuries he sustained the third possibility is
considered more likely
the rapid and efficient action of the third officer and the a/b undoubtedly
saved the life of the chief officer how the a became to fall is unknown but it
is believed to be either due to the facemask of the breathing apparatus
being knocked off during the removal of the chief officer or due to him slipping
during the same phase of the recovery and being overcome in the nitrogen-rich
atmosphere within the tank a superintendent was visiting a vessel
to carry out an annual inspection as part of the inspection he was to enter
and examine the condition of the ballast tanks the vessel had a double skin and
the ballast tanks extended from the double bottom around and up the sides of
the ship all had a centerline division thus creating port and starboard tanks
access was achieved through manhole covers on the main deck
close to the ship's side the ship's management team were prepared for the
inspection and the chief officer had emptied and ventilated a number of tanks
prior to arrival alongside enclosed space entry procedures as detailed in
the company safety management system were being satisfactorily followed the
superintendent entered a number 3 starboard ballast tank accompanied by
the deck cadet an a/b was detailed as watchman at
the after manhole cover and a mechanical air driven ventilation fan was running
on the forward manhole cover both the superintendent and the deck cadet were
carrying portable flashlights and the deck cadet had a portable radio which
put him in contact with both the officer of the watch and the chief officer the
superintendent also carried a camera which he was using to make a
photographic record of the inspection
the vessel had recently landed moderately heavily against the corner of
a berth and there was an indentation in the shell plating in this tank as well
as a damaged stiffener the two men descended vertically partway down the
tank and then moved forward along along the two dnal stringer to the location of
the damage quite close to the forward bulkhead which divided at number three
starboard ballast tank from number to starboard directly forward there was
some noise from the fan above which also blocked out any additional light that
might have been available through the open forward manhole cover the
restricted width of the space meant that the two men had to move in file
the superintendent leading when they reached the indentation the
superintendent brought out his camera and took a few shots from aft holding
the flashlight and cameras together and playing the light beam onto the damaged
area he then turned handed his flashlight to the deck cadet and
instructed him to direct the beams from both flashlights in a similar manner
while he took a few more pictures
the superintendent then moved a couple of meters forward all the time facing
aft until he was ahead of the damage he raised the camera to his eye and framed
his picture he could not quite include all the detail he needed so he eased his
way further forward at this point he fell backwards through a lightning hole
in the stringer he managed to catch himself as he fell but suffered three
fractured ribs bruising and cuts to both shins and forearms and severe shock
neither man had seen the danger as the flashlights were being used to highlight
the area of damage the superintendent was moving backwards and was between the
deck cadet and the lightning hole thus obscuring any view that he might have
had the nature of the space meant that it was impractical to rig any kind of
defensive barrier around every hole in every stringer but the superintendent
should have been alert to the dangers presented by the structure
this 68,000 deadweight tons Bob carrier was loaded with a cargo of petroleum
coke otherwise known as pet coke the holes of the vessel were accessed down
vertical ladders at each end of the compartment when she arrived in port for
discharge the ship was boarded by a young surveyor who told the chief
officer in conversation while they were completing the paperwork that he was on
his first job alone without a senior surveyor supervising his work he
explained that his instructions call for samples from each hold the hatches were
still closed of the vessel came alongside and the crew commenced opening
them working from forward but it seemed to be taking longer than usual the chief
officer left the surveyor in the ship's office and went on deck to try and speed
up the process the surveyor decided to start taking his samples and went on
deck himself as there appeared to be a problem with a hatch forward he decided
to start at the aft hold he released the securing jobs on the starboard side at
the aft end of number 8 hold and opened the lid he then lowered his sampling
gear inside the trunk and climbed inside leaving his notebook and baseball cap on
a frame nearby
some minutes later the deck cadet passing down the same side of the deck
spotted the cap and the book and paused to investigate he then spotted the open
hatch and looked inside he could just make out the heel of a boot under the
edge of a frame in the beam of his flashlight the Decca debt ran out to the
side of the ship and jumped up and down waving his arms and shouting until he
gained the attention of a sailor forward then ran back to the hatch he then
evidently entered the hold himself in an attempt to reach the man inside the
sailor forward who had seen the DECA debt had in the meantime run aft and
quickly appraised the situation luckily a second sailor arrived shortly
behind him and this man had a radio and raised the alarm one man then stayed by
the hatch and the other went to the safety Locker on the poop deck to get
her self-contained breathing apparatus
the chief officer was next to arrive on scene followed almost immediately by the
third officer the chief officer put his leg over the combing of the hatch and
made to climb straight down into the hold as well the third officer reminded
him of the likely dangers of the atmosphere inside the hole but he swung
his other leg over onto the top of the ladder as well the third officer then
shouted at the chief officer and an argument ensued with the third officer
actually grasping the chief officer around the neck and the chief officer
striking out the third officer in return the two of them by now shouting
continuously at each other at this stage the master arrived at the hatch and
immediately ordered the chief officer to climb back out of the hatch the dead
cadet was seen to be in a sitting position on the surface of the cargo
with his back against the access ladder but not moving rescue equipment and more
personnel had now started to arrive and the third officer and second engineer
Don self-contained breathing apparatus and climbed down the ladder two of the
crew on the direction of the master opened the hatch
when the rescue team reached the deck cadet he was seen to have vomited and
was semi-conscious but clearly still alive
the surveyor was either unconscious or dead within minutes the two were lifted
back up to the deck the alarm had also been raised on shore and the medical
team from the installation was soon on board the surveyor was confirmed as dead
at the scene and the deck cadet was transferred to hospital where over the
next few days he made a steady recovery the surveyor succumbed to the lack of
oxygen and presence of fumes in the hold and the deck cadet almost suffered an
identical fate the clear thinking and determination of the third officer in
restraining the chief officer despite his seniority undoubtedly prevented a
third casualty this example involves a general cargo vessel with a conventional
forepeak tank and collision bulkhead a sluice gate valve is mounted inside the
forepeak tank with a transmission to the fo'c'sle deck due to a misalignment in
the transmission rods to the deck this arrangement failed and the coupling
broke off making it impossible to empty the tank in the normal way it was
decided to contract a shoreside firm with suitable equipment at the next port
of call to empty the forepeak tank and carry out the necessary repairs this
happened to be in a tropical area with high humidity a portable air driven deep
well pump was to be lowered into the forepeak tank through the manhole the
pump was to be driven by an air compressor itself driven by a separate
diesel generator located on the key side adjacent to the fo'c'sle setup intended
by the contractor
when the tank was partially emptied the pump had to be relocated lower down in
the tank being maneuvered past one of the internal stringer plates one of the
fitters entered the tank believing that fresh air was being drawn in from
outside as the tank was D ballasted shortly after entering the forepeak and
descending to the stringer plate he was seemed to sit down
then slump forward with his back to the bulkhead and adjacent to the ladder the
alarm was raised and a rescue party assembled the compressor was stopped and
D ballasting halted as the temperature and humidity of the time of the incident
were both extremely high and the fitter was somewhat elderly the rescue team
initially suspected that the man had simply attempted too much the chief
officer therefore entered the tank without a breathing apparatus to assist
the fitter he reached the man and fitted him into a safety harness that had been
lowered from above as the team outside began to pull he guided the
semi-conscious fitter through the manhole
as he exited himself however he was conscious of a nausea sensation and
severe headache such that he too required assistance both men were taken
to hospital but returned to the ship later in the day
subsequent investigation and analysis revealed that both sludge and rust in
the forepeak were minimal however it was noted that the compressor and generator
had been arranged facing each other on a flatbed trailer parked in the Lee of the
fo'c'sle there was no wind and in effect the intake of the compressor was
directly in line with the exhaust outlet of the diesel generator with each stroke
of the pump inside the forepeak contaminated air was being added to the
atmosphere no meter readings were taken either prior to or following the entry
so the theory remains unproven but is considered to be the most likely cause
of the problem either way both men were lucky to escape from what was
undoubtedly a hazardous atmosphere
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